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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN CRIMINAL LAW AND
PROCEDURE IN THE NINTH CIRCUIT: PART *
I.

INTRODUCON

by Vincent J. Maretla**
The task undertaken by the Loyola Law Review of analyzing and
reviewing cases decided during the past year by the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals in the area of criminal law is an important one which will
inure to the benefit of all members of our profession. The rapidly
changing nature of criminal law is often alluded to by writers and theoreticians, while practitioners in this area are quick to acknowledge the
formidable task of keeping abreast of recent decisions.
Moreover, because this vast body of law evolves on a case-by-case
basis it becomes of paramount importance for judges and lawyers to
achieve and maintain a broad perspective with respect to its development. Such a frame of reference not only facilitates the ability to
anticipate trends and future case development but also minimizes the
possibility of anomalies occurring which might otherwise result from the
seriatim nature of case development. An analysis of appellate court
decisions is a valuable method of keeping abreast of recent legal developments as well as a vehicle by which insight and a frame of reference
can be developed.
Potential weak points in our criminal justice system which up to now
have largely remained dormant are being forced to the surface by the
steadily increasing number of criminal cases with which the system must
deal. In arenas both within and without the profession the current
debate centers upon the quality of our criminal justice system. Of
course, any such discussion must include the revelation that steadily
increasing criminal caseloads are taxing the system to its limits at all
levels. It is now commonly conceded that the federal judiciary from the
Supreme Court to the United States Magistrates is overworked and that
* This is the first of two parts dealing with Ninth Circuit decisions in the area of
criminal law and procedure.
** Assistant United States Attorney, Central District of California, Fraud and Special Prosecutions Section. The views expressed herein are those of the author and do not
necessarily represent the views of the United States Department of Justice or any other
agency of the federal government.
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this burden is a direct result of the ever-increasing number of criminal
cases. The effect of this barrage of criminal cases is unmistakable. It
manifests itself as a glut on the criminal justice system with potentially
grave consequences. These consequences are by no means limited to
the judiciary, as will attest any criminal investigator, prosecutor, public
defender, probation officer, or prison official.
Although the inherent limitations on the Supreme Court's ability to
deal with increasingly large numbers of criminal cases have been readily acknowledged for some time, it is only recently that an awareness
has emerged that, due to a number of factors, federal courts of appeals
show well-developed symptoms of the same malady. This, of course,
is not to imply that state judiciaries are free from these concerns. Ominously, the most recent statistics from the Federal Bureau of Investigation clearly show that crime is on the increase; hence caseloads in the
area of criminal law will continue to rise in the coming year. The only
solace offered by these recent crime figures is that the rate of the increase in crime has fallen off to some small degree. However, the increase in crime continues unabated.
In the federal system we are undoubtedly on the threshold of major
changes brought about in part by the enactment of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure and the Federal Rules of Evidence. These legislative changes, in some cases, are substantial and extend both to the
substance and form of criminal practice in the federal courts. However,
other enactments by Congress, such as the Speedy Trial Act, by virtue
of their very existence attest to the widespread belief that the legal system has become increasingly unable to deal effectively and promptly
with criminal cases.
All or some of the above have served to focus attention on the federal criminal justice system in general and the appellate level in particular. Proposed suggestions for reform to ease the burden of the
court of appeals range from the elimination or curtailment of oral argument to dividing the geographical area which presently composes the
Ninth Circuit. The courts themselves are also well aware of their present burden and have instituted a myriad of reforms.
According to some legal writers, an additional, though unstated
reason for the growing emphasis which is being placed on reform and
the quality of justice at the appellate level is that, due to the limitations
on the Supreme Court, the courts of appeals are quickly becoming the
final arbiters in an increasing number of criminal cases. Hence, the
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opinions and positions of the courts of appeals which relate to major
issues have achieved increased importance.
In reviewing the decisions of the Ninth Circuit, it is at once apparent
that over the past year, despite problems caused by an increased caseload, the court has taken what may be considered major positions on
some important and heretofore troublesome aspects of criminal law.
In many instances -these recent decisions have, in large measure,
changed existing case law and in virtually all cases in these areas the
courts opinions have spoken to controversial issues. When some of
these recent opinions are considered, along with earlier decisions of the
Ninth Circuit, certain trends can be discerned in a number of areas of
criminal law.
One area of criminal law which has been the subject of great controversy in this and other circuits is the defense of insanity. In the future
there is no doubt that the inevitable debate will continue regarding legal
aspects of the insanity defense such as the appropriate standard to be
applied, legal presumptions, issues of lay testimony, and burdens of
proof.
However, while the discussion persists as to these legal issues as well
as the omnipresent factual issues which are involved in the insanity
defense, it has become increasingly apparent that the role of experts in
criminal cases, particularly in the psychiatric area, has expanded to
unsettling proportions. Not only have cadres of psychiatric experts
become a fact of life in criminal cases where competency is at issue or
where insanity is claimed as a defense, but these experts, with increased frequency, also have reared their heads in criminal trials where
neither competency nor sanity is in issue. Psychiatric experts now attempt to offer their opinions on a number of issues unrelated to sanity
or competency of the defendant, including the credibility of government witnesses and the defendant's inability, because of psychological
factors, to act with specific intent.
The expanding role of psychiatric experts in criminal trials is in part
the by-product of decisions of the Ninth Circuit in various areas, and, in
light of some recent opinions of the Ninth Circuit, it seems that this
trend may endure in the future.
One factor in the increased use of psychiatric experts in criminal cases
is the relative ease with which such experts can be appointed under
existing statutes as interpreted by the Ninth Circuit. Psychiatrists and
psychologists are appointed as a matter of course in criminal cases upon
a minimal showing of necessity, usually upon the request of an attorney.
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Thus, a psyohiatrist can be appointed in a number of ways for a variety
of purposes. For example, an appointment of a psychiatrist or psychologist to act as a defense expert must be made for an indigent defendant
under the Criminal Justice Act.1 A psychiatrist can also be appointed
by the court for any purpose under the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure, 2 or pursuant to statute to determine the defendant's competence to stand trial.3 Finally, the federal district court has the inherent
power to appoint an expert to determine a defendant's sanity at the time
of the offense.4
In addition to the ease with which a psychiatrist can be appointed, a
contributing factor in the increasing amount of such expert testimony in
criminal cases is the line of Ninth Circuit opinions which in effect
requires the government to produce an expert if the defense offers
expert testimony on the issue of insanity. 5
However, the expanding role of the psychiatric expert in criminal
cases is not solely attributable to the more frequent use of expert
testimony in cases involving issues of sanity or competency. The increasing frequency of expert testimony is coupled with growing pressure
upon, and the resultant tendency of, the Ninth Circuit to broaden the
permissible scope of the psychiatrist's testimony, the effect of which is to
introduce into a criminal trial more and more abstruse psychological
concepts. In short, not only is psychiatric expert testimony becoming
more frequent in criminal cases, but it is becoming more complicated
and psychiatrists are being asked to formulate opinions in more difficult
areas.
For example, in recent years, the Ninth Circuit has addressed itself to
the issue of whether or not the expert testimony of a psychiatrist is
admissible to negate the element of specific intent, even though insanity
is not in issue. The court initially ruled that such testimony was not
admissible, basing its holding in part upon an expressed doubt that the
state of the developing art of psychiatry was such that testimony as to
1. 18 U.S.C. § 3006(A)(e) (1970); United States v. Hartfield, 513 F.2d 254, 258
(9th Cir. 1975); United States v. Bass, 477 F.2d 723, 725-26 (9th Cir. 1973).
2. FED. R. Cim. P. 28(a).
3. 18 U.S.C. § 4244 (1970); United States v. Bass, 477 F.2d 723, 725 (9th Cir.
1973); Meador v. United States, 332 F.2d 935, 936 (9th Cir. 1964).
4. United States v. Wade, 489 F.2d 258, 259 (9th Cir. 1973); United States v.
Malcolm, 475 F.2d 420, 424 (9th Cir. 1973).
5. United States v. McGraw, 515 F.2d 758, 760 (9th Cir. 1975); United States v.
Shackelford, 494 F.2d 67, 69-70 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 934 (1974); United
States v. Cooper, 465 F.2d 451, 453 (9th Cir. 1972).
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subtle gradations of specific intent had enough probative value to be
admitted. 6 However, the court, again considering this issue, ruled that
the admissibility of such evidence will generally be held to rest within
the sound discretion of the trial court' If the Ninth Circuit's most
recent pronouncement marks a liberalizing trend in this area, one can
expect to see psychiatrists testifying retrospectively not only as to the
defendant's sanity, but also as to a whole host of other psychological
and emotional infirmities which do not amount to insanity yet ostensibly
have an untold effect on a defendant's ability to formulate specific intent
to commit a crime.
Another avenue by which more complicated psychiatric testimony
will be introduced in criminal trials stems from the Ninth Circuit's
recent reaffirmation of its earlier ruling s that a defendant lacks substantial capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct (hence
legally insane) if he knows his act to be criminal, but commits it because
of a delusion that it is morally justified.9 It is apparent that such a
standard invites expert testimony as to the existence and effect of
delusions and goes well beyond the relatively straightforward issue of
whether or not a defendant knew his actions were legally wrong.
As a result of many of these decisions, as well as from the very nature
of the insanity defense, it is obvious that the psychiatric expert has
become, and will continue to be, a fixture in criminal cases. Because
expert testimony has been used increasingly in contexts other than that
of insanity, the relevant and somewhat perplexing question that will face
the court in the future is the extent to which such testimony will, and
can, continue to be relied upon and whether or not such testimony is
proper in criminal cases where sanity or competency is not in issue.
In addition to the defense of legal insanity, another area of criminal
law which has been plagued by controversy from its inception is the
defense of entrapment.1" In past years the Ninth Circuit addressed
6. Wahrlich v. Arizona, 479 F.2d 1137, 1138 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1011
(1973). See also United States v. Haseltine, 419 F.2d 579 (9th Cir. 1969), rev'd on
other grounds sub nom., United States v. Bishop, 412 U.S. 346, 351-54 (1973).
7. United States v. Demma, 523 F.2d 981, 986-87 (9th Cir. 1975); United States v.
Barnard, 490 F.2d 907, 913 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 959 (1974). In
Demma, the court also reiterated its earlier ruling that the trial court has discretion to
admit the testimony of a defense psychiatrist on the issue of credibility of government
witnesses. 523 F.2d at 986.
8. Wade v. United States, 426 F.2d 64, 73 (9th Cir. 1970).
9. United States v. McGraw, 515 F.2d 758, 760 (9th Cir. 1975).
10. Compare Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 370 (1958) (Warren, CJ.),
with id. at 378 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Compare Sorrells v. United States, 287
U.S. 435, 438 (1932) (Hughes, C.J.), with id. at 453 (Roberts, I., dissenting).
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itself to various aspects of the entrapment defense and, in a number of
cases, the court made attempts to broaden the defense." However, in
many respects, this trend was halted when the Ninth Circuit's opinion
in UnitedStates v. Russell' 2 was reversed by the Supreme Court.
During the past year the Ninth Circuit again considered aspects of the
controversial defense of entrapment and in the course of doing so made
a major change in the existing law of this circuit.' 3 The court sitting en
banc ruled that a defendant in a criminal action may assert the defense
of entrapment without being required to admit that he committed the
offense or any of its elements. 14 Although this represents a radical
alteration of the existing law in this circuit, the change is not as abrupt
as it may appear at first blush. In retrospect, foreshadowing of the new
rule can be discerned from events which occurred at the circuit level as
early as 1973. At that time a panel of the court addressed this issue
and reaffirmed the existing rule that a defendant must admit the elements of the offense before he could avail himself of the entrapment
defense. However, the opinion in that case was later modified and the
portion which ruled upon this particular entrapment issue was eliminated and was conspicuous in its absence.' 5 Thus, rather than being an
abrupt change of direction, it appears that the court's recent pronouncement in the area of entrapment was more akin to the final mutation in
an evolutionary process.
With respect to future developments in this area, especially in the
wake of the Supreme Court decision in United States v. Russell,'0 it
seems that the bulk of controversial issues facing the Ninth Circuit will
be factual *ones, centering upon whether or not the government's actions violated due process. In making these determinations the circuit
court will probably continue to use a bifurcated approach, first analyzing the facts of the case using the somewhat narrowed due process
standard set out in Russell,'7 and then applying the appropriate entrap11. See, e.g., Greene v. United States, 454 F.2d 783, 786 (9th Cir. 1971).
12. 459 F.2d 671 (9th Cir. 1972), rev'd, 411 U.S. 423, 436 (1973).
13. United States v. Demma, 523 F.2d 981, 986 (9th Cir. 1975), overruling Eastman
v. United States, 212 F.2d 320 (9th Cir. 1954).
14. 523 F.2d at 982. The Ninth Circuit's new rule comports with that of some other
jurisdictions. Hansford v. United States, 303 F.2d 219 (D.C. Cir. 1962); Crisp v.
United States, 262 F.2d 68 (4th Cir. 1958). See also People v. Perez, 62 Cal. 2d 769,
401 P.2d 934, 44 Cal. Rptr. 326 (1965).
15. United States v. Glassel, 488 F.2d 143, 146 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S.
941 (1974).
16. 411 U.S. 423 (1973).
17. Id. at 43 1-32.
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ment standard. 18
Another area of criminal law which has been the subject of great
debate involves the existence and function of the grand jury. In recent
cases decided in the state court, the grand jury system has been attacked to the extent that suggestions have been made to abolish it.19
However, there is little, if any, indication that such a feeling exists on
the federal side. The absence of this inclination may be attributed to
a number of factors, not the least of which is the restriction placed upon
the judiciary in this area by the constitutional requirement for the existence of the grand jury on the federal side. 20 An additional factor may
be that the Supreme Court has recently reaffirmed the broad powers
2
of the grand jury. '
Despite the fact that there is no indication that the Ninth Circuit
desires to institute a comprehensive reform of the grand jury system,
the court has evidenced a desire, through a number of its opinions, to
exercise some degree of control over certain practices which occur before
the grand jury. For instance, the court has been increasingly receptive
to the concept of recording grand jury testimony if a timely motion is
made.22 However, the court has not altered the broad rule that absent
a motion there is no requirement that grand jury proceedings be recorded
or transcribed.23
That the court is willing to exercise some degree of control over grand
jury practices and procedures is also evident from the increasing tendency of the court to intervene in grand jury proceedings on an ad hoc
basis. When such an intervention has occurred, the court has used its
broad powers under the due process clause to voice its opinion on
certain practices or to respond to factual situations that it finds distasteful.2 4 But the continuation of this trend toward intervention on a case18. See United States v. Lue, 498 F.2d 531 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1031
(1974); United States v. Greenbank, 491 F.2d 184 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 931
(1974). See also United States v. Ladley, 517 F.2d 1190 (9th Cir. 1975).
19. See generally Johnson v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. 3d 248, 539 P.2d 792, 124 Cal.
Rptr. 32 (1975).
20. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
21. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
22. United States v. King, 478 F.2d 494 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 846 (1973);
United States v. Prince, 474 F.2d 1223 (9th Cir. 1973); United States v. Thorensen, 428
F.2d 654 (9th Cir. 1970).
23. United States v. Antonick, 481 F.2d 935, 937 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
1010 (1973).
24. United States v. Wong, - F.2d - (No. 74-1636, 9th Cir. Nov. 23, 1974),
petition for cert. filed, 43 U.S.L.W. 3392 (U.S. Nov. 22, 1974) (No. 635); United States
v. Basurto, 497 F.2d 781 (9th Cir. 1974).

